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Inline Threat Generation for Modeling and Simulation


TECHNOLOGY AREA(S): Information Systems

The technology within this topic is restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), which controls the export and import of defense-related material and services. Offerors must disclose any proposed use of foreign nationals, their country of origin, and what tasks each would accomplish in the statement of work in accordance with section 5.4.c.(8) of the solicitation.


OBJECTIVE: Elicit new and innovative approaches to perform inline threat generation (ITG) in a constructive digital simulation, without having to pre-generate the threat data, in order to stimulate modeling and simulation (M&S) used for missile defense performance assessment.


DESCRIPTION: High-fidelity, constructive digital simulations are used to assess the performance of missile defense at the element and system level. Pre-scripted input files consisting of high-fidelity data that effectively portray the kinematics, signatures and lethality-related traits of red force missiles in a “truth” sense, stimulate various models so that the truth inputs are appropriately “perceived” by the missile defense element models and simulations during simulation runtime. There are currently no processes, tools, or software that can generate the necessary detailed high resolution truth data “inline” during runtime of a constructive digital simulation.

New innovative technologies are needed that will enable ITG in these high-fidelity constructive simulations. This innovative capability would enhance the credibility of simulations in the M&S Enterprise, shorten integration time (enabling efficiency gains and reducing event schedules), produce greater quantities of quality, credible decision quality data, and expand the envelope of behaviors assessed via M&S by allowing red forces to react and change "inline" based on what is occurring on the simulation “gameboard” during runtime. If successful, the approaches developed under this effort could be applied to the problem of producing similar truth data for blue force interceptor flyouts.

Input data considerations: The ITG capability should be able to take as inputs the minimal set of parameters and inputs that are currently used for offline, pre-scripted threat generation tools, as well as any parameters that may be required for simulated responsive behavior of the threat object that could not have been predicted priori. This input data would include both “scenario independent” missile and signature characterization/data from the Intel community and other threat authorities, as well as “scenario specific” parameters about any and all particular missile flyouts in any given scenario.

Runtime considerations: The slower a simulations runs, the less the assessment data that is available. The inline threat approach being investigated here would presumably shift the time investment of threat data production from "pre-execution" to "in-execution". The end-state desire would be that, when rolled up, this shift in where and when threat data is generated would be a net positive in terms of impacts to simulation employment timelines, as compared to the legacy, pre-scripted approach. In other words, we do not want inline threat generation to so “bog down” the runtime performance of the overall simulation that, in the end, the simulation employment timeline would have been better off to have stayed with pre-scripted threats. To that end, also note that the use of the word "inline" does not mean that leveraging of already pre-existing threat data, at least as a point of departure during runtime, for example, is necessarily prohibited.

V&V considerations: “Offline” threat tools and their outputs are rigorously validated and verified as “standalone” modeling software and are used to create pre-scripted threat data. Information provided by the appropriate authorities in the Intel and threat communities validate these missile models and corresponding signatures. An inline threat capability needs to adopt and apply the same rigor and processes that the credibility of threat data created by ITG is similarly unimpeachable. It may seem obvious or a truism to say that software tools should be verified and validated; however, it is highlighted here as a special concern and emphasis area for the use of M&S for performance assessment.


PHASE I: Develop a proof-of concept prototype/demonstration of the ITG approach, including a simulation conceptual model and top-level architecture of how a high-resolution ITG capability would be integrated into a system-of-systems simulation comparable or traceable to a simulation. Demonstrate approaches to verification and validation of the ITG. Proof-of-concept for this phase may be related to unclassified surrogate red force and blue force models or other systems, or options for a stand-in for the overarching simulation could be provided GFE. The Phase I effort could be appropriately scoped to an initial subset of inline threat data production demonstration versus the entire threat data package. Provide an initial CONOPS for V&V of the inline threat tool. Demonstrate initial capability for truth interaction of threat data creation, i.e. modification or creation of threat data during runtime in reaction to truth data that emerges on the runtime "gameboard", in a way that could not have been pre-scripted and was not explicitly part of the user input parameters.


PHASE II: Using the conceptual model and insights gained from the Phase I prototype, develop a working ITG, encompassing a capability to generate inline all types and amounts of threat data currently developed today for performance assessment simulation. Major emphasis of Phase II would then be on a rigorous V&V demonstration and benchmarking against an analogous legacy set of threat generation capabilities.


PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: Deploy working ITG capability within missile defense applications. Develop operational interfaces with existing simulation tool sets. Update the ITG to keep pace with adversary data and threat models needed for current-day simulation efforts. Support all activities for endorsement/accreditation of the ITG capability leading to accreditation by the appropriate authorities. Ensure that design encompasses modularity (i.e. upgradeability) and usability, such that keeping pace with operational threat changes does not entail massive ITG development efforts and code changes, but rather input parameter changes, with documentation via conceptual model, specifications and user instruction, per M&S development best practices. Investigate expansion of ITG capability to also encompass blue force interceptor truth data generation.


COMMERCIALIZATION: The technology developed here could tie into commercial opportunities related to high-speed computing as related to simulation of complex systems-of-systems.


KEYWORDS: Simulation, Missile Modeling, Missile Signatures, High-Speed Computing

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