Advanced IC Design Techniques for the Prevention of Reverse Engineering of the Programmed Functionality in FPGAs

Award Information
Agency:
Department of Defense
Branch
Missile Defense Agency
Amount:
$999,998.00
Award Year:
2007
Program:
STTR
Phase:
Phase II
Contract:
HQ0006-07-C-7655
Award Id:
78099
Agency Tracking Number:
B064-008-0076
Solicitation Year:
n/a
Solicitation Topic Code:
n/a
Solicitation Number:
n/a
Small Business Information
MICROELECTRONICS RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT CO (Currently Microelectronics Research Development Corporation)
4775 Centennial Avenue, Suite 130, Colorado Springs, CO, 80919
Hubzone Owned:
N
Minority Owned:
N
Woman Owned:
N
Duns:
619085371
Principal Investigator:
Martin Denham
Principal Investigator
(541) 385-9464
marty.denham@micro-rdc.com
Business Contact:
Mary Dyson
Director Business Operations
(505) 294-1962
mary.dyson@micro-rdc.com
Research Institution:
ARIZONA STATE UNIV.
Larry Clark
Research & Sponsored Projects
PO Box 873503
Tempe, AZ, 85287 3503
(480) 727-0295
Nonprofit college or university
Abstract
Military and space-application FPGAs are invaluable for improving defense capabilities and deployment schedules; however, they also create a potential vulnerability if their configuration code can be discerned or if they can be directly used in unauthorized systems. Modern IC debug and repair techniques, such as PICA and FIB, represent formidable attack tools, which when combined with other attack strategies (such as electromagnetic [EM], power analysis [PA], and Power-Cycling) and sufficient time could defeat present-day FPGA security systems. This Phase 2 STTR effort will create novel circuits and procedures that realize FPGA security features that defeat the above attack strategies, protect the FPGA configuration store, and render the device unusable by a potential aggressor. Robust encryption techniques will protect the FPGA configuration code and IO paths from discernment by unauthorized users. Each IC will be programmed with unique hardware keys that can only be reverse engineered destructively. A defense-in-depth strategy includes robust symmetric encryption circuits that are immune to EM, PA, and LVP and PICA optical probing. Distributed attack detection circuits and IC disabling circuits will defeat exhaustive key searches and power-cycling.

* information listed above is at the time of submission.

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